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ABSTI!ACT 
EXISIENCE, LOCAL UNIQUENESS, AND OPTI.MALITY OF A MARGINAL COST 
PRICING EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOL'Y WITH INCREASING RETIJRNS 
This paper proposes a notion of equilibrium for an economy 
with increasing returns to scale and gives sufficient conditions for 
its existence and local uniqueness. The optimality properties of this 
equilibrium notion follows from our previous investigations on 
economies with increasing returns. 
The notion of equilibrium used in this paper, i.e. a marginal 
cost pricing equilibrium, is a family of consumption plans, production 
plans, prices and lump sum taxes such that: all the first order 
conditions are satisfied in equilibrium; the lump sum taxes cover the 
aggregate losses of firms with increasing returns to scale; •ii 
markets for goods and services clear. 
The intended model is an economy with a regulated natural 
monopoly and a large number of unregulated competitive firms. 
EXISTENCE, LOCAL UNIQUENESS, AND OPTBIALITY OF A MARGINAL COST 
PRICING EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY WITH INCREA SING RETURNS 
Donald J. Brown and Geoffrey M. Heal 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper proposes a notion of equilibrium for an economy 
with increasing returns to scale and gives sufficient conditions for 
its existence and local uniqueness. 
Vie offer two proofs of existence. The first is based on an 
elegant fixed point argument of Mantel. Our proof that regular 
economies, with increasing returns, have an odd number of locally 
unique equilibria, which extends Kehoe's theorem on regular economies
· 
with production [10], gives an index-theoretic proof of existence. 
This second argument requires additional assumptions on the technology 
and p references. 
The intended model is an economy with a regulated natural 
monopoly and a large number of unregulated competitive firms. The 
increasing returns to scale technology of the natural monopoly is 
viewed as a nonconvex production set, where marginal cost pricing may 
lead to a deficit. The production possibilities of the competitive 
finas comprise convex sets. All firms price at marginal cost and 
households are price taking utility maximizers su bject to lump-sum 
taxes which cover the losses incurred by the regulated monopoly. 
This is an extensive revision of a discussion paper [l], that 
we circulated several years ago, in which we proposed a notion of 
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equilibrium for an economy having a single firm with a nonconvex 
production set. Subsequently, Mantel produced a simpler proof of the 
existence of such an equilibrium, albeit under stronger assumptions on 
the set of feasible social production possibilities than we had used. 
We shall show that his argument can be extended to an economy which 
includes a decentralized set of competitive firms. 
A marginal cost pricing equilibrium is a set of consumption 
plans, production plans, lump-sum taxes and prices, where the 
regulated firm is given an efficient production plan and instructed to 
price at marginal cost, i.e. buy and sell inputs and outputs in the 
plan at the associated prices. Competitive firms maximize profits at 
equilibrium prices. All competitive firms are limited, i.e. we assume 
that shareholdings in firms carry limited liability. Each consumer is 
subject to a lump-sum tax, and these in aggregate cover the losses of 
the regulated firm. In addition, we require market clearing and the 
first order conditions for Pa reto optimality to hold in equilibrium. 
Hence the �rices faced by the natural monopoly are market clearing 
equilibrium prices. 
This notion of equilibrium in economies with increasing 
returns is suggested by Hotelling's classic contributions to the 
marginal cost pricing literature, see [7] and [8], where he considers 
an economy in which all products are priced at marginal cost and the 
difference between marginal and total cost is recovered through 
lump-sum taxation. 
II. MANTEL'S PROOF 
In this section. we outline Mantel's proof of existence [11]. 
Mantel assumes that Y, the set of feasible social production 
possibilities net the social endowment, is a compact comprehensive 
subset of R+. the non-negative cone; the efficiency frontier of Y, n 
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eff(Y), is a rf n-1 dimensional submanifold of R+; p(z). the normal to n 
Y at z (the marginal rates of transformation at z). is strictly 
positive for all z e eff(Y). These assumptions imply that eff(Y) is 
diffeomorphic to the n-1 dimensional simplex [12]. Hence eff(Y) is a 
fixed point space. 
We assume that there are a finite number of consumers each of 
whom has a continuous strictly quasi-concave locally non-satiated 
utility function, Ui. on his consumption set, Xi. a closed convex 
subset of R+. containing o. n 
We assume initially a fixed structure of revenues, i.e. the 
ith consumer's endowment w. 1 aiw. where w is the social endowment. 
and his share of the jth firms's profits or losses 9 . . = a  . •  where the � 1 
ai are positive real numbers which sum to one. This assumption will 
guarantee that each consumer's budget set is a nonempty. compact set, 
with nonempty relative interior, for each pair <z.p(z)> where 
z e eff(Y). 
Given z e eff(Y) and p(z), then the ith consumer maximizes
U.(x) over x e R+. subject to the constraint : p(z) · xi a.p(z) · z. 1 n 1 
Under our assumptions, this optimization problem is well defined and 
* 
has a unique solution, which we denote xi(z,p(z)). Aggregate demand, 
X(z,p(z)), is then \" x�(z.p(z)). 4- 1 
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For any v e R+/{o}, R+ excluding origin, we define n(v), the n n 
projection of v onto eff(Y), as the intersection of the ray from o 
through v with eff(Y). Mantel (implicitly) assumes that n is a 
continuous function. 
He now constructs the continuous map 4> : eff(Y) � eff(Y), 
where z � (z,p(z)) � X(z.p(z)) � n(X(z,p(z))). Since eff(Y) is a 
• 
fixed point space, 4> has a fixed point z by Brouwer's theorem. It 
• * * • 
then follows from Walras's law that (z w), p(z ), and X(z ,p(z )) 
constitute a marginal cost pricing equilibrium. This argument is 
summarized in Figure 1 for the two-good case. 
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The major technical differences between our present model and 
Mantel's model are: firstly, the compactness of Y is not assumed but 
is derived from assumptions of irreversibility. free disposal. and 
closeness of the aggregate production set; secondly. the normalized 
vector of marginal rates of transformation, p(z), is now only required 
to be transverse to o, i.e. p(z) • z ) 0 for all z e eff(Y); finally, 
we assume that eff(Y) is a connected c1 n-1 dimensional submanifold 
of it. n 
Good 2 
5 
FIGURE 1 
Aggregate 
/f Indifference 
"'"�es 
Good 1 
A diagramatic representation of the proof of existence. z E eff(Y) 
generates prices p(z) and demand x(z,p(z)). Xis projected by IT onto 
eff(Y), and the process starts again. A fixed point is a marginal 
cost pricing equilibrium. 
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Maintaining our other assumptions on tastes and technology, we 
show that Y is a compact subset of R+; eff(Y) is diffeomorphic to the n 
n-1 dimensional simplex, which we denote as�; and n : R+/[o) -> n 
eff (Y) is a c1 map. 
Assuming a fixed structure of revenues, we show that Mantel's 
map has a fixed point which is a marginal cost pricing equilibrium. 
Later we demonstrate that the case of general ownership rights can be 
reduced to a fixed structure of revenues. 
III. TIIE MODEL 
In this section, we lay out the assumptions of our model. 
Consumers are indexed over i, where i e (1,2,,.,,C). Firms are 
indexed over j, where j e (1,2,,,,,F,F + l}, 
(Al) For each i, Xi is the consumption set of consumer i and Xi is a 
closed convex subset of R+, which contains o. n 
(A2) For each i, Ui is the utility function of consumer i and Ui is 
continuous, strictly quasi-concave, and locally non-satiated ,  
(A2) ' For each i, Ui is the utility function of consumer i and Ui is 
c2, n2uCx) is negative definite on the kernel of DU(x), U. is 1 
monotone, and the closures of the indifference curves of U lie 
in R
++, the positive cone. That is, preferences are smooth as n 
defined by Debreu. 
(A3) For each i, w. is the endowment of consumer i and w. is an 1 1 
element of X.. [ w. (j) i T. where L is set of labor services 1 1 
jeL 
a nd T is tota l time available for consumption. 
(A4 ) w = \ w. is the social endowment. 4- 1 1 
(AS) For each j. 
( i) Y. is the production set of producer j J 
(ii) Y. is a closed subset of R J n 
(iii) o e Y. J 
(iv) eff(Y.) is a k. dimensional c1 J J 
submanifold of R • n 
(A6 ) Firms indexed by 1 through F have convex production sets. 
(A7) 
( i) 
(ii) 
[ Y. is closed 
J J 
(\Y.) � (-R+).Lr. J n J 
free disposal 
(iii) AC[ Y.) n - AC[ Y.) = {OJ. irreversibility 
J J J J 
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where A(H) denotes the asymptotic cone of II. a subset of Rn. 
(AS) The aggregate fea sible set is defined a s  Y. where 
Y = C[ Y. + w) n R+ J n J 
( i) eff(Y) is connected 
(ii) eff(Y) is a n-1 dimensional c1 submanifold of R+ n 
(iii) p(z) • z > o for all z £ eff(Y). 
(AS)' The aggregate fea sible set is defined a s  Y, where 
Y = (\y_ + w) n R+ Lr. J n J 
(i) eff(Y) is a<?- hypersurface in R+ n 
(ii) p(z) > > o for all z £ eff(Y), i.e. p(z) is positive 
in every component. 
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(A9) The endowments w. and shares& .. constitute a fixed structure of 
revenues. i. e. 
1 1J 
(i) ai are positive real numbers which sum to one 
(ii) w. = a. w. for all i 1 1 
(iii) & .. 1J ai. for all i and j. 
If we a ssume a fixed schedule of revenues, then the income of 
the i th consumer, Ii. can be expressed a s
p w. + 1 
F 
ai L p j=l yj + aip YF+l • HenceF 
Ii = P 
. w. + a. 1 1 [ p . y. - T . • where T. is the lump-sum ta x J 1 1 
-aip YF+l • 
j=l 
Also I. = a.p • z. where z = w + [ y . •  1 1 . J J 
We define a marginal cost pricing equilibrium as a 4-tuple 
• • • \ . . L y .• x 
j J 
I: x;. • • (xi, Ti' Y j• p), where y 
i 
and z = y + w, such 
that: 
• 
(i) U.(x .) = max {U.Cxllp • xi p • w. 1 1 1 1 x £ X. 
F i 
+ � & ij P 
• y; - Ti) 3=1 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
• x • z 
• 
p is normal to the tangent space of eff(Y.) a t  y ., J J 
for all j. 
Ti is the lump-sum tax imposed on consumer i, and 
� Ti + P • Y;+l = o. 
1 
For firms with a convex technology, condition (iii) in the 
definition of a marginal cost pricing equilibrium implies profit 
• 
maximization at y., with respect to prices p. More genera lly, it J 
implies that the first-order conditions for profit maximization a re 
satisfied, with marginal rates of transformation and substitution 
equal to price ratios. This seems the obvious generalization of 
marginal cost pricing beyond a single-output partial equilibrium 
world. 
IV. EXISTENCE lHEOREM 
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Our proof of existence follows the structure of Debreu's proof 
[4], i.e. first, we prove existence a ssuming compactness of the 
consumption and production sets; second, we show that the attainable 
sets of consumers and producers are compact, using a theorem of 
Hurwicz and Reiter [9]; finally, we demonstrate that any marginal cost 
pricing equilibrium in the economy defined in terms of atta inable 
consumption and production sets is also a marginal cost pricing 
equilibrium in the original economy. Initially we a ssume a fixed 
schedule of revenues. 
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H, a subset of R+ is said to be comprehensive if x e H, y e R+ n n 
and y i x  implies y e ll • 
Proposition (1). (H. Samelson) Let Y be a compact comprehensive 
subset of R+ and eff(Y) a connected c1 hypersurface in R+ such that n n 
for all z e eff(Y), p(z) • z ) o. Then eff(Y) is diffeomorphic to the 
n-1 dimensional simplex a nd n : R+/ {o} -> eff(Y) is a c1 mapping. n 
The proof of this proposition is given in the a ppendix. Note 
that Mantel's assumption on the continuity of n follows from 
Samelson's theorem. The role of the condition p(z) • z > o in 
ensuring that eff(Y) is diffeomorphic to the n-1 dimensional simplex, 
is indicated in Figure 2 .  This shows a case where p(z) • z = o at 
points A and B, and along the vertical and horizontal lines the map 
that retracts eff(Y) to the simplex is not one to one. In economic 
terms this case causes problems because at A and B the value of the 
production z at its associated prices p(z), is zero. Hence consumers 
may have empty relative interiors to their budget sets. 
11 
FIGURE 2 
A 
Good 2 
� eff(Y)
.. (n-1) Simplex 
Good 1 B 
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Le111ma (1). If each X. is a compact convex subset of R+ , containing o, 
1 n 
and p(z) z ) o, then the budget correspondence Pi is continuous at
z, where P. (z) = {x e X. lp(z) • x. 5. a. p(z) • z) . 1 1 1 1 
Proof: See lemma (3) in [4]. 
Theorem (1). An economy has a marginal cost pricing equilibrium if 
for every i, X. is a compact convex subset of R+ , containing o; 1 n 
a ssumptions (A2) , (A3) a nd (A4) hold; Y is a compact comprehensive 
subset of R+; a ssumptions (AS), (A6), (AS), and (A9) hold. n 
Proof: Since we a ssumed a fixed structure of revenues, the budget 
correspondence for the ith consumer, pi ( z) , is defined as 
{x e X. I p  ( z) . xi 5. aip(z) 
. z) for all z e eff(Y). P. < zl is a 1 1 
continuous correspondence on eff(Y) by (A8) a nd lemma (1). Hence by 
(A2), X(z, p(z)) is a continuous function of eff(Y). Therefore, 
Mantel's ma p 4>: eff(Y) -7 eff(Y) is continuous a nd ha s a fixed point 
• 
z , by proposition (1). Local non-satiation of the utility functions 
gua ra ntees the validity of Walras's law, i.e. 
p( z) • X( z, p( z)) = p( z) • z. for all z e eff(Y). Consequently, 
• • • • 
X(z , p(z )) = z .  Since each eff(Y.) is a manifold and y. e 
• 
where z 
• 
J J 
\ . . [... y. + w, p(z ) is normal to the tangent space of 
J J 
at yj, for each j. 
eff(Y.), J 
eff(Y.) J 
In a recent paper [9] , Hurwicz and Reiter gave sufficient 
conditions for an economy to have a bounded fea sible set without 
a ssuming convexity of production or consumption sets. In the next 
lemma we show that their conditions are met by our economy. It will 
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then follow that the attainable set of each agent is compact and that 
Y is compact. 
Let 
Mw = {<x 1•• • • •xc•Y1 • • • •
•Y F+l> I>i [ y. + w} 
J 
J 
1 
A w [(llX.) X (llY.)] n M i 1 j J w 
x 
y 
AC[Xi) 
1 
AC[ Y.) 
J J 
X. = {x e X.I :i:. ex_, kFi. and y. a Y. such that 
1 1 � " J J 
<x1•••••xc•Y1•····Y F+1> 8 Mw}. 
set of consumer i. 
X. is the attainable 
1 
Y. ={ye Y.I yk e Yk' kFj, and x. e X. such that J J 1 1 
<xl • • • •• xc• Y1 • • • • •Y F+l> £ Mw} • 
set of producer j. 
Y. is the attainable J 
ProJ>os_ij;ion (ll_. (Hurwicz and Reiter) 
If ( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Lemma (3). 
If ( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
. 
x n y = {o} 
. 
X n (-X) = {o} 
. . 
Y n C-Y) = {o} 
then A w is bounded. 
xi is closed, o e X., and X. s;; R
+ for all i 
1 1 
Y. is closed for all j 
J 
[ Y. is closed 
J J 
( Y.) � (-R ), free disposal [ + . J n J 
. 
Y n (-Y) = {o}. irreversibility 
n 
then (a) Y is a compact comprehensive subset of R+ n 
A A 
(b) X. and Y. are compact sets, for all i and j. 1 J 
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Proof: Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that A is closed, X. s;; R+ for w 1 n 
+ • + all i, hence [ X. !;; R and X !;; R • 1 n n 1 
. 
Therefore, X n (-X) = {o]. 
• + + (iv), Y � -R , but X = R .  Hence Y :2 -X. Therefore n n 
By 
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-Y n Y :! - Y n - X which implies {o} = Y n X, by (v). It follows from 
proposition ( 2) that Aw is bounded, hence compact. X. and Y. are 1 J 
simply projections of Aw and therefore compact. Since the sum of 
compact sets is compact, we see that [ Y. + w is compact. o e X 
j J 
implies that y = <[. Y. + w) n R+ � [. Y. + w. Moreover, it follows 
J J n J J 
from (iii) that Y is closed and therefore compact. 
Theorem (2). If an economy E satisfies assumptions (Al) through (A9), 
then E has a marginal cost pricing equilibrium, 
Proof: The conditions of lemma (3) hold for E, hence X. , Y. 
' 1 J 
are 
compact for all i and j; and Y is a compact, comprehensive subset of 
R+, Since eff(Y) satisfies the hypotheses of Samelson's theorem, n 
eff(Y) is a fixed point space and � is a continuous mapping by 
proposition (1). Choose a compact, convex set K in R+ containing in n 
, 
its interior all the attainable consumption sets Xi and define Xi = K 
, , 
for all i. Note that o is in each Xi. Call this economy E • E 
satisfies all the assumptions of theorem (1) and hence has a marginal 
• • • • • • 
cost pricing equilibrium <x1, • • •  ,xc' <:1:1• • • •• xc' Y1• • •" YF+l; p) 
• • • 
= L x;, • = [ y�. • • Y1' YF+l; p), Let x y and z = y + w, then 1 J J 
• • • • 
P = p(z ), and x = z • Hence each x. is attainable. A routine 1 
• 
argument shows that each xi is optimal in 
b. e x. (p(z *> 1 1 
• • 
xii aip(z ) • z }, which completes the proof. 
Note that we have actually proved the existence of a marginal 
cost pricing equilibrium that is socially efficient. Of course, if 
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all firms have a convex technology then a marginal cost pricing 
equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in the sense of Arrow-Debreu. 
Obviously, our analysis can be extended to a regulated monopolistic 
sector having several firms. 
We now remove the restrictive assumption of a fixed schedule 
of revenues by defining the after tax income of the ith consumer I., 1 
for given z e eff(Y), as p • wi + 
F 
T. = p • w. + \ e . .  p ' y. - a .p 1 1 � � J 1 3=1 
F 
L e .. p '  y - T. where p 
j=l 1J 1 
p( z)' 
z, and a. are some fixed set of1 
positive real numbers which sum to one. Thus whatever are the pre-tax 
incomes, taxes may be chosen so that the after tax incomes constitute 
a fixed structure of revenues and the previo•s proof suffices. 
F 
equilibrium lump-sum taxes are just p ' w. + \ e . . p 1 L � j=l 
V. LOCAL UNIQUENESS 
• 
yj - aip 
The 
• 
z 
• 
In this section, we make assumptions that imply that all goods 
in the economy are final goods, i.e. that there are no goods which are 
exclusively intermediate goods, This is an unrealistic assumption in 
an economy with production, but technically it allows us to impose the 
following condition: 
(Cl) There are no equilibria on the boundary of eff(Y). 
The analogous assumption for exchange economies was first 
proposed by Nishimura (13). 
Note that (Cl) follows from (A2) ' and (AS) ' .  In addition, 
these assumptions imply that 4> is c1• 
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We define a smooth economy with increasing returns, E, as one 
satisfying assumptions (Al), (A2) ', (A3) , (A4), (AS), (A6), (A7),
(A8) ', and (A9) . 
E is said to be regular if o is a regular value of 4> - I. 
Theorem (2). If E is a regular smooth economy with increasing 
returns, then E has an odd number of locally unique marginal cost 
pricing equilibria. 
Proof: By hypotheses, E has no equilibria on the boundary of eff(Y). 
Moreover, each equilibrium is isolated by the inverse function 
theorem. Hence E has a finite number of equilibria, since eff(Y) is 
compact. 
If E is regular, then 4> is a Lefschetz ma�see Guillemin and 
Pollack [4] for a lucid discussion of Lef schetz fixed-point theory. 
The global Lefschetz number of 4> denoted L(fl) is equal to � Lx(f) 
4>(x)=x 
where Lx(f) = sign of the determinant of Dl>(x) - I. Since eff(Y) is
diffeomorphic to the n-1 dimensional simplex, we see that L(fl) equals 
the Euler characteristic of the simplex, i.e. L(iJ>) = 1. Hence 4> has 
an odd number of fixed points. We complete the proof by noting the 
one-to-one correspondence between the fixed points of 4> and the 
marginal cost pricing equilibria of E,--assuming that the underlying 
exchange economy is regular; generically, we can choose the technology 
such that no fixed point of 4> is an exchange equilibrium. 
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VII. OPIIMALITY 
In [2], we considered an economy with increasing returns, 
where there is one firm and two consumers; the firm is owned by a 
single consumer. The notion of equilibrum considered in that paper is 
marginal cost pricing. Hence the results of that paper apply here. 
That is, there exists economies with increasing returns to scale where 
no marginal cost pricing equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In other 
words, the first welfare theorem does not hold for economies with 
increasing returns, if the equilibrium notion is marginal cost 
pricing. 
In [3], we showed that the second welfare theorem does hold 
for our equilibrium notion. That is, every Pareto optimal allocation 
can be supported by a marginal cost pricing equilibrium after a 
suitable redistribution of ownership rights. 
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOS ITION ( 1) 
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Without loss of generality, we assume that eff(Y) is contained 
in the interior of the unit disk, Dn . Let Sn be the boundary of Dn' 
i.e. S = lx e R I llxll = 1, where II • II, is the Euclidean norm}. n n 
Define g : R /lo} -> S as g(x) = x/l lxl I and let f : eff(Y) °" S+ be n n n 
the restriction of g to eff(Y), where S+ = S n R+ . We shall show n n n 
that f is a diffeomorphism. 
g(x) is homogeneons of degree o and hence by Euler's theorem: 
Dg(x)v = o for all x e R /lo} and for all v of the form ax/llxll. n 
where a is some real number. We now wish to show that f is a local 
diffeomorphism, i.e. that Df(x), the restriction of Dg(x), is 
nonsingular on Tx, the tangent plane to eff(Y) at x, for all 
x e eff(Y). 
Let N be the one dimensional subspace spanned by x/llxl I.x 
where x e eff(Y), and Vx be the n-1 d imensional subspace which is 
orthogonal to N , i.e. V ={ye R ly • x = o}. x x n 
Suppose Dg(x)v = o for some v e Rn and x e eff(Y). Express v 
as v1 + v2 where v1 s Nx and v2 e Vx. Dg(x)v = Dg(x)v1 
+ Dg(x)v2 = Dg(x)v2 
o. Dg(x) is nonsingular on Vx' since g(x) is 
the Gauss map for the sphere of radius llxl I with center at o. 
Therefore, v2 = o, and we have shown that Dg(x)v = o iff v = ax
l lxl I,
for some real number a. 
Let v s Tx' the tangent space to eff(y) at x. If Df(x)v = o,
then Dg(x)v = o since Df(x) is simply the restriction of Dg(x). Hence 
Df(x)v = o implies that v s Nx' but by hypothesis p(x) • x > o, i.e. 
v s Tx implies vf.ax for any non-zero real number a. Therefore v = o 
and Df(x) is nonsinglar on Tx. 
We now need two propositions from [3].
Proposition (3). Let & : 13 °" 13 be a local homeomorphism, 13 compact 
and ll connected. Then & is a covering map. 
Proposition (4). Let & : II °" II be a covering map, ll arcwise 
connected and ll simply connected. Then & is a homeomorphism. 
Since f is a local diffeomorphism, f is a covering map by 
proposition (3). S+ is simply connected and therefore f is a n 
homeomorphism of eff(Y) onto s+ by proposition (4). Since f is a n 
local diff eomorphism, its inverse map is differentiable and is 
therefore a diffeomorphism. 
Finally, n : R+/ lo }  => eff(Y) can be expressed as the n 
20 
composition of the c1 maps g and f-1, i.e. n(x) = f-1og(x), hence n 
is c1• 
21 
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